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Do Family Caps Reduce Out-of-Wedlock Births? Evidence from
Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia

Abstract

Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1989 to 1999, we examine the impact of
family cap policies, which deny incremental welfare benefits, on out-of-wedlock birth rates. We use
the first five states that were granted waivers from the Department of Health and Human Services
to implement family caps as “natural experiments.” Specifically, we compare trends in out-ofwedlock birth rates in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia to trends in states that
did not implement family caps or any other waivers prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). We employ several techniques to increase the
credibility of results from our “natural experiment,” such as the inclusion of multiple comparison
groups, controls for differential time trends, and “difference-in-difference-indifferences” estimators.
Our regression estimates generally do not provide evidence that family cap policies reduce the
incidence of out-of-wedlock births among single, less-educated women with children.

Keywords: Welfare, Family Caps, Fertility
JEL Classification: I3, J1

1. Introduction
On September 13, 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services awarded
Alabama, California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Michigan each $20 million for
achieving the largest decreases in out-of-wedlock births between 1994-95 and 1996-97. These
were the first awards, which will be made annually, granted as part of the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) to encourage states to
reduce non-marital childbearing. One of the most controversial policies that many states have
used to combat out-of-wedlock births is the family cap or child exclusion policy, which
eliminates the extra monetary benefits traditionally entitled to women who have additional
children while receiving welfare.1 Seventeen states implemented family caps as waivers to the
federal requirements of the original Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,
and several additional states have implemented family caps since PRWORA was enacted
(Crouse, 1999).
Supporters of the family cap policy argue that incremental benefits encourage welfare
recipients to have additional out-of-wedlock children, and, thus, the elimination of these benefits
will reduce this “perverse” incentive (DHHS, 1997). This argument is supported by the standard
economic model of fertility, which posits that the demand for children decreases when the net
cost of having children increases.2 Because the removal of incremental benefits increases the net
cost of having children, it is suggested that family cap policies will reduce fertility. This theory,
however, does not offer a prediction regarding the size of the effect on fertility. For example, the
effects may be small if many pregnancies are unplanned, incremental benefit levels are low
relative to the perceived costs of raising children, nonpecuniary factors dominant the fertility
decision, or expected welfare durations are short.
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Prior to 1992, all states provided incremental increases to welfare benefits for additional children. These
monthly incremental benefits ranged from $24 to $134 in 1990.
2
See Becker (1981).

Interestingly, the experimental evaluations accompanying family cap waivers in New
Jersey and Arkansas do not provide strong evidence of a negative effect on fertility (Camasso, et
al. 1998 and Turtora, Benda and Turney 1997). However, these family cap evaluations have been
criticized extensively (see Maynard, et al. 1998 for example). In both the New Jersey and
Arkansas experiments it was found that many of the AFDC recipients in the control group
thought they were subject to the family cap. The New Jersey experiment also was criticized
because it was found that some of the AFDC recipients in the experimental group did not report
births to welfare officials because these births did not result in increased benefits. Nonexperimental studies of the impact of family cap policies have largely provided mixed results.
Most of these studies, however, rely on state-level data or provide only indirect evidence on the
effects of family caps.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence from the first five
states that were granted waivers from the Department of Health and Human Services to
implement family caps. Using microdata from the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates
among single, less-educated women with children in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and
Virginia to several sets of comparison states that did not implement family caps or any other
waivers during our sample period, which was prior to the implementation of Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs.3 We also compare trends in birth rates
between groups of women who are differentially affected by family cap policies (single vs.
married) and interact these two trends to create a "difference-in-difference-in-differences"
estimate of the effect. The results from our analysis of birth rates are based on the experiences of
several states and should be less susceptible to "contamination bias" and underreporting of births
than the experimental evaluation results. Our econometric modeling of the birth decision at the
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micro level, exclusion of post-TANF years, and use of less-educated married women as an
additional control group differs from most of the non-experimental literature on family caps.

2. Past Literature
Several recent studies have examined the impacts of family caps on fertility. We first
briefly examine the evidence from the experimental evaluations that accompanied family cap
waivers in New Jersey and Arkansas.4 In the evaluation of New Jersey's Family Development
Program, Camasso, et al. (1998) find that birth rates among the experimental group of AFDC
recipients who were subject to the cap fell from 11 percent in 1992-93 to six percent in 1994-95.5
They also find, however, that the decline in birth rates among the control group of AFDC
recipients who were not subject to the cap was nearly identical, suggesting that the family cap had
little impact. The results from the evaluation of the Arkansas family cap waiver similarly indicate
no statistical difference between trends in birth rates among the experimental and control groups
of AFDC recipients.
Notably, these family cap evaluations have been criticized for two main reasons. First, in
both the New Jersey and Arkansas experiments it was found that many of the AFDC recipients in
the control group thought they were subject to the family cap.6 This "contamination bias" may
have allowed the family cap to affect the behavior of the control group making it difficult to
identify policy effects from a comparison of trends in birth rates between the two groups.
Second, the New Jersey experiment also was criticized because it was found that some of the
3

We do not include post-TANF years in the analysis period because of the substantial differences in
welfare programs across states resulting from the implementation of TANF programs, making it difficult to
isolate the effects of family caps.
4
See Grogger, Karoly and Klerman (2002) for a more detailed review of the experimental evidence.
5
New Jersey’s family cap policy was implemented as part of the state’s Family Development Program.
6
In the evaluation of the Arkansas experiment, Turturro, Benda, and Turney (1997) note that some AFDC
caseworkers "reported that they simply told clients that a family cap on benefits may apply to them” (p. 2).
Maynard, et al. (1998) cite an article in the Wall Street Journal that reports survey results indicating that in
the New Jersey experiment the control group was as likely to believe that the family cap applied to them as
the experimental group.
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AFDC recipients in the experimental group did not report births to welfare officials because these
births did not result in increased benefits (see Maynard, et al. 1998 for more details). Thus, the
reported birth rates of the AFDC recipients subject to the family cap in New Jersey likely were
understated.
In response to these concerns over the experimental design and the publicity generated by
the controversial family cap policy, the New Jersey research team developed a quasiexperimental design to compare actual outcomes under the Family Development Program to
projected outcomes in the absence of the program (Camasso, et al. 1998). Using administrative
welfare data and Medicaid claims files from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, they
find evidence of a significant decline in births to AFDC recipients after implementation of the
program.
Other non-experimental studies of the impact of family cap policies provide mixed
results. Horvath-Rose and Peters (2001) use state-level data from 1984 to 1996 to measure the
impact of welfare waivers, including family caps, on the ratio of non-marital to marital births.
Estimating fixed-effect regression models, they find that family cap policies have a negative and
statistically significant effect on the non-marital birth ratio. Using Vital Statistics Natality Data
from 1989 to 1998 compiled by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Kearney (2003)
explores whether family cap policies reduce the number of births in states implementing them.
The results from her fixed effects regressions using state-level data for log births do not provide
evidence that family caps reduce births or additional births to women ages 15-34. Mach (2001)
uses matched data from the March CPS to examine the effects of family caps on fertility. She
finds that the fertility of welfare recipients, but not all women, is roughly 10 percent lower when
subject to family caps. Welfare receipt, however, may be endogenous and the use of all other
women as a control group for studying the effects of family caps on welfare recipients may be
problematic because the groups differ substantially in levels of education, marriage rates and
employment rates.

4

Joyce, et al. (2003) use state-level data aggregated from induced termination of
pregnancy files, national nativity files, and the CPS to explore the relationship between family
caps, and birth and abortions. They use birth and abortion rate data for 24 states over the period
from 1992 to 1999 and employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator which
identifies the effects of family caps from a comparison of changes over time in birth and abortion
rates between women at risk of being affected by family caps and women not at risk of being
affected by family caps. They find that trends over the family cap period in birth and abortion
rates were similar for women with previous live births (the at-risk group) and women with no
previous live births (the not at-risk group), and conclude that the downward trend in birth rates
and upward trend in abortion rates are not a response to family caps.
Several additional empirical studies provide indirect evidence on the likely impact of
family cap policies by examining the effect of incremental AFDC benefit levels on higher-order
births.7 These studies use the existing variation in incremental benefit levels across states, time,
or both to estimate the size of the effect.8 Powers (1994), Argys and Rees (1996), and Robins and
Fronstin (1996) find some evidence that incremental benefits have a positive effect on out-ofwedlock birth rates. These findings suggest that family cap policies, which reduce or eliminate
incremental benefits, may be effective in discouraging childbearing among welfare recipients.
However, Acs (1996), Fairlie and London (1997), and Grogger and Bronars (1996) do not find
evidence of a positive effect of incremental benefits on fertility, thus raising doubts about the
efficacy of family cap policies.
The empirical evidence on the effects of family cap policies clearly is mixed. We
provide new evidence on the effectiveness of these policies by analyzing the birth decisions of
7

See Moffitt (1992, 1998) for reviews of the literature on the effect of welfare benefits on any births.
Although these studies provide mixed results, Moffit notes that a majority of the more recent studies
indicate that welfare benefits have a positive and statistically significant effect on fertility.
8
In addition to these national level studies, a few state level studies exist. Keefe (1983) finds that the large
increase in total and incremental AFDC benefits from 1970 to 1971 in California did not increase fertility
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women found in the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group
(ORG) files. Specifically, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates among single, lesseducated women with children in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia to several
sets of comparison states that did not implement family caps or any other waivers during our
sample period. Our analysis of birth rates differs from the experimental evaluations because it is
based on the experiences of several states and should be less susceptible to "contamination bias"
and underreporting of births. Specifically, we do not distinguish between women in the
experimental and control groups. Instead all women living in a family cap state are considered to
be subject to the family cap, and thus we are less concerned that welfare recipients in the control
group thought they were subject to the family cap. The CPS is also a household survey and
provides no differential incentive to report or not report births between the control and
experimental groups. Respondents simply report the number and ages of all children currently
living in the household.
Our analysis also differs from recent non-experimental studies of the effects of family
caps in that we empirically model the birth decision at the micro level allowing us to include a
rich set of controls for individual characteristics and precisely define the samples used for
treatment and control groups. To be sure, Mach (2001) also uses microdata from the CPS to
estimate regressions for the probability of a birth, but the use of the March CPS (which is one
third the size of the ORGs) and matching from one year to the next (which only is possible for
less than 50 percent of respondents) results in substantially smaller sample sizes than the ORGs.9
The approach we use also differs from Horvath-Rose and Peters (1999) in its focus on out-ofwedlock birth rates instead of the non-marital birth ratio and differs from Kearney (2003), Joyce,
et al. (2003) and Mach (2001) in that we exclude post-TANF years because of concerns over the
among recipients in the state. Rank (1989) finds that AFDC recipients in Wisconsin have lower birth rates
than women in the general population.
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substantial differences in welfare programs across states resulting from the implementation of
TANF. We also provide separate estimates for family cap states allowing for heterogeneity in
treatment effects, use multiple sets of control group states, and use less-educated married women
with children and their interaction with family cap states (i.e. difference-in-difference-indifferences) as additional control groups.10

3. Empirical Strategy
AFDC FAMILY CAP WAIVERS
Prior to the passage of PRWORA in 1996, the Department of Health and Human Services
was authorized to waive certain requirements of the federal AFDC program to give states the
flexibility to experiment with policies and projects to further the goals of the AFDC program
(DHHS, 1997). These AFDC waivers represented the beginning of welfare reform in the 1990’s
in that they were a response to the widely held belief that AFDC created work disincentives,
encouraged out-of-wedlock childbearing and discouraged marriage (DHHS 1997 and Maynard et
al, 1998). The majority of AFDC waiver policies can be categorized as follows: family caps,
termination/reduction time limits, changes to JOBS work exemptions, changes to JOBS
sanctions, increases in earnings disregards, and work requirement time limits (Crouse, 1999).11
Out of the six major categories of waivers, family caps were the only policies designed to directly
target childbearing incentives, and thus represent the waiver policy most likely to have an impact
on fertility.

9

The sample of welfare recipients from the 22 states implementing family caps over the period from 1989
to 2000 includes 568 observations of which 25 experienced births in the March CPS.
10
Joyce, et al. (2003) also use a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator, but compare changes in
birth rates for less-educated single mothers to birth rates for less-educated single women without children.
Identification relies on the assumptions that the birth rate differential between mothers and non-mothers is
only affected by the family cap and that non-mothers who desire more than 1 child are not affected by the
family cap.
11
See DHHS (1997) for a complete description of each type of waiver.
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The first state to implement a family cap policy was New Jersey in 1992. In the years
that followed, several other states implemented family cap policies either as waivers under the
AFDC program or as part of their TANF plan. Table 1 lists all states that implemented a family
cap policy as of 1998.
We made the following decisions in determining which of these states to include in our
treatment group of family cap states. First, we addressed the issue of whether to include TANF
years in our analysis. TANF, which replaced AFDC in 1996, provided states with a substantial
amount of flexibility in designing new welfare programs. Given that TANF resulted in major
changes to state welfare programs, isolating the effect of the family cap on fertility becomes
increasingly difficult in post-TANF years. Therefore, we decided to exclude post-TANF years
from our analysis and focus on the effect of family cap policies implemented as waivers under the
former AFDC program.
Second, we wanted the post period (i.e. the time period following the implementation of a
family cap AFCD waiver) to be of sufficient length for examining policy effects on birth rates.
We examined each state’s family cap implementation date and grace period and determined that a
good cutoff would be summer 1995, which guaranteed more than a year for the post period. The
first five states to implement family cap policies as AFDC waivers—Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana,
New Jersey, and Virginia—did so by this cutoff date. These states became our treatment group.
Other family cap states did not implement their policies until just prior to TANF, which does not
allow a sufficient time period for examining policy effects on birth rates in these states.
Among the five family cap states included in our analysis, the loss of monthly
incremental benefits ranged from $42 in Arkansas to $102 in New Jersey.12 The specific details
of family cap policies varied somewhat across these states. New Jersey, for example, allows
12

The incremental benefit is calculated as the difference between the AFDC maximum benefit for a family
of two and the maximum benefit for a family of three. These estimates are from the Urban Institute’s
Assessing the New Federalism State Database at www.urbaninstitute.org and United States Congress,
House Committee on Ways and Means (1992).
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capped families to increase their earnings from work without experiencing a decrease in their
current cash assistance amount (Gallagher et al, 1998). Similarly, Virginia allows families to
retain all child support payments for a child subject to its family cap, while Indiana provides
vouchers for goods worth up to half of the incremental benefit increase denied (DHHS, 1997). It
also is important to note that most states have a 10-month grace period during which new welfare
recipients can give birth to additional children who will not be subject to the family cap
(Gallagher et al, 1998). One state, Georgia, had a 24-month grace period under its family cap
waiver.
To be sure, four of the five states used in the following “natural experiment” – Georgia,
Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia – also implemented other waivers under AFDC. Indiana and
Virginia implemented a termination or reduction time limit waiver. Indiana, New Jersey and
Virginia implemented changes to JOBS work exemptions, and Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and
Virginia had waivers for JOBS sanctions. Virginia also implemented a work requirement time
limit and an increased earnings disregard waiver. Finally, Indiana implemented a waiver of the
100-hour rule of its AFDC-UP program (DHHS 1997 and Crouse 1999).
Although these waivers may alter the opportunity costs of having children, they do not
directly target the fertility decisions of welfare recipients, and thus are less likely to have an effect
on out-of-wedlock births than the family cap. In support of this assertion, Horvath-Rose and
Peters (1999) find that the only waivers that had a consistently negative effect on the ratio of nonmarital to marital births are the family cap and AFDC-UP waivers (although only for teenagers).
Furthermore, the waivers, with the possible exception of the increased earnings disregard waiver
in Virginia, were generally intended to reduce AFDC caseloads, and thus should have a negative
effect, if any, on non-marital fertility.13 It is useful to note, however, that a major difficulty in this

13

Horvath-Rose and Peters (1999) note that the effect of the increased earnings disregard on non-marital
fertility is ambiguous because it both increases eligibility for welfare and increases the opportunity cost of
9

area of research is identifying the independent effects of specific waivers or TANF policies. We
return to this issue when we draw conclusions about our results.

COMPARISON GROUP OF NON-FAMILY CAP STATES
To examine whether the family cap policies implemented in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana,
New Jersey, and Virginia had an effect on fertility, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth
rates between these five "family cap" states and states that did not implement a family cap or any
other waiver during our sample period. For brevity, we refer to these five states as "family cap"
states in the analysis although four of them implemented additional waivers. A simple approach
is to compare mean outcomes between the treatment group (i.e. family cap states) and comparison
group (i.e. non-family cap states) in the time period before the policy change (the pre period) and
in the time period after the policy change (the post period).14 Assuming that the implementation
of family cap policies is the only factor differentially affecting fertility between the treatment and
comparison groups, a negative "difference-in-differences" estimate implies that family cap
policies reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates.
To create our comparison group of non-family cap states, we considered several things.
First, we wanted to remove the potential effects of any waivers on post-period observations. To
accomplish this, we identified when each non-family cap state implemented its first AFDC
waiver. Then we excluded observations that fell in the time period following implementation of
any AFDC waiver. Second, as with the treatment group of family cap states, we wanted the post
period for each comparison state to be of sufficient length for our analysis. We chose November
having an additional child on welfare. See Horvath-Rose and Peters (1999) for a thorough discussion of
the expected effects of all AFDC waivers on non-marital childbearing.
14
In defining the pre and post periods, we take into account each family cap state’s grace period. Georgia,
for example, had a 24-month grace period. Therefore, the earliest date its family cap (implemented in
January 1994) would have applied to a newborn is January 1996. Since our focus is on the decision to
have an out-of-wedlock birth, the earliest an AFDC recipient in Georgia could have decided to have an
additional child that would be subject to the family cap is May 1995. Thus, Georgia’s post period begins
on May 1995.
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1995 as the cutoff as this guaranteed that each state in the comparison group contributed at least
one full year of post period observations. Therefore, we excluded all states that implemented any
AFDC waiver before November 1995. Finally, we excluded all observations in post-TANF
years. In the end, the observations from our comparison group of states should be free of both
waiver and TANF effects.
As a result of these decisions in creating our treatment and comparison groups of states,
the post period for each family cap state ends in the month prior to when the state implemented its
TANF program. The post period end date for each non-family cap state in our comparison group
is the minimum of either the TANF implementation date or the implementation date of any
AFDC waiver. The post-period end date, therefore, varies by state.
After applying the aforementioned criteria, the full comparison group consists of 28 nonfamily cap states, located throughout the United States. These states are listed in Table 2. In
comparing out-of-wedlock birth rates between our family cap and non-family cap states, we also
utilize more geographically restricted comparison groups that consist of subsets of states from our
full comparison group. These subsets are non-family cap states in the South and those in the
Northeast.
Before proceeding with the analysis of trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates, it is useful to
compare trends in a few alternative factors that may have differentially affected fertility between
family cap and non-family cap states. In Table 2, we report AFDC maximum benefit levels,
abortion providers, and unemployment rates for the years 1992 and 1996 for each state in our
analysis. These years roughly correspond to the periods before and after the implementation of
family cap policies in our five states. Large differences in the trends in these variables across
states could contribute to differential trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates between family cap
states and non-family cap states.
Interestingly, the trends in AFDC benefit levels were very similar across the included
states. In fact, all five family cap states and 11 non-family cap states had essentially the same
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decline in maximum benefit levels for a family of three.15 Almost all other comparison states
experienced declines in AFDC benefit levels from 1992 to 1996 of a similar magnitude.
Oklahoma experienced a decline of 20 percent, while Kentucky and New Mexico experienced an
increase in AFDC benefit levels from 1992 to 1996. Other than these exceptions, the trends in
AFDC benefit levels did not differ substantially between the family cap and non-family cap
states. For a more formal test, we also regressed AFDC benefit levels on state fixed effects, a
dummy for 1996, and an interaction between family cap states and 1996. The coefficient
estimate on the family cap state and 1996 interaction is small and statistically insignificant.
Most states experienced large decreases in the number of abortion providers from 1992 to
1996.16 More importantly for this analysis, however, is that the declines in the number of
abortion providers among family cap states were comparable to the declines in most non-family
cap states. The main exception was New Jersey, which experienced an increase of six abortion
providers from 1992 to 1996. This may have an effect on trends in out-of-wedlock births in New
Jersey or be the result of these trends. Finally, changes in economic conditions (as measured by
unemployment rates) from 1992 to 1996 in the family cap states did not differ substantially from
those in non-family cap states. Unemployment rates generally declined substantially between
these two years.17
Overall, trends in AFDC benefit levels, abortion providers, and unemployment rates were
fairly comparable between family cap and non-family cap states. This is important because
glaring differences in these trends could signal that our choice of a comparison group is
inappropriate.

15

The 11 percent decline in these states was due to constant nominal benefit levels between 1992 and 1996
and an increase in the CPI of 11 percent.
16
Unfortunately, we do not have statistics on the size of providers.
17
We also find small and statistically insignificant coefficients on a family cap state - 1996 interaction in
regressions for abortion providers and unemployment rates.
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ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In Section 4, we first compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates in Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia to trends in states that did not implement family caps or any
other waivers prior to PRWORA. Although a comparison of these trends may be informative, it
will not control for the potential effects of differential trends in demographic characteristics. To
control for these factors, we estimate equations for the probability of a birth using our sample of
single, less-educated women with children. Formally, we assume that fertility is determined by
an unobserved latent variable
(2.1)

Bist* = µs + γt +φ'Pst + δ'Fs*Pst + β'Xist + εist,

where Fs is a dummy variable indicating a family cap state, Pst is a dummy variable indicating a
post-family cap time period observation, Xist is a vector of individual characteristics, µs is a fixed
effect for state s, γt is a fixed effect for year t, and εist is the disturbance term.18 Only the
dichotomous variable, Bist, is observed, however. It equals 1 if Bist* ≥0 (denoting that a birth
occurred in the previous year) and equals 0 otherwise (denoting no birth). If we take εist to be
normally distributed, the assumptions imply that the data are described by a probit model.
Although the normality assumption should only be taken as an approximation, the probit model
provides a useful descriptive model for the binary event that a birth occurred. We also adjust the
standard errors for the presence of common random shocks at the state level to address concerns
regarding understated standard errors and serially correlated outcomes for the U.S. grouped
regressions (see Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2002). For the other specifications, where we
do not have a large enough number of groups, we estimate heteroscedasticity-robust (i.e. HuberWhite) standard errors.

18

Note that the "main" effect for family cap states, Fs, is captured by the state fixed effects, but that the
"main" effect for the post period, Pst, is not captured by the year fixed effects because it is determined by
the month of implementation.
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In Equation (2.1), the effectiveness of the family cap policy is determined by examining
the sign and statistical significance of δ.19 A negative and statistically significant estimate of δ
provides evidence that family cap policies reduce the birth rate among single, less educated
women with children. We can also examine the robustness of this estimate by selecting several
different treatment and comparison states.
A potential concern with this interpretation of δ is that there may have existed differential
trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates between the family cap and comparison states that began
before the implementation of family cap policies. For example, a negative estimate of δ may
simply be due to a more rapid downward trend over the past decade in the out-of-wedlock birth
rate in the family cap states than in the non-family cap states. To control for this potential bias,
we also estimate probit regressions that include a separate linear time trend, t, for the family cap
states
(2.2)

Bist* = µs + γt + φ'Pst + λ'tt* Fs + δ'Fs*Pst + β'Xist + εist.
Another approach to examining the effectiveness of the family cap policy is to compare

trends in birth rates between single, less-educated women with children and married, lesseducated women with children within family cap states. These married women theoretically
should not be affected (or at least only minimally affected) by family cap policies because they
are not typically eligible to receive AFDC benefits, but may be affected similarly by other factors
affecting fertility among low-income women.20 Therefore, we use married, less-educated women
with children as a comparison group and restrict our sample to only family cap states. The
equation is
(2.3)

Bist* = µs + γt + φ1'Pst + φ2'Sist + δ'Sist*Pst + β'Xist + εist,

19

We are implicitly assuming that the effects of family caps are immediate and do not evolve over time.
Although there may exist spillover effects or incomplete information regarding the policies implying larger
effects over time, our approach represents an approximation to this dynamic process.
20
Married women are eligible for welfare benefits through the AFDC-UP program. However, only seven
percent of all families on AFDC receive benefits through the AFDC-UP program (United States Congress,
House Committee on Ways and Means, 1992).
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where Sist is a dummy variable indicating that the woman is single. Again, in this equation a
negative and statistically significant estimate of δ provides evidence that family caps reduce outof-wedlock births.
A combination of the identification strategies used in Equations (2.1) and (2.3) suggests
that the family cap should only (or at least largely) affect the fertility decisions of single women
with children who live in family cap states during the post-family cap period. Therefore, an
additional estimation strategy is the "difference-in-difference-in-differences" estimator
(2.4)Bist* = µs+ γt + φ1'Pst + φ2'Sist + α1'Sist*Fs + α2'Sist*Pst + α3'Fs*Pst + δ'Sist*Fs*Pst + β'Xist + εist.
In this specification, identification of δ comes from comparing the change over time in the
difference between the birth rates of single and married women in family cap states to the change
over time in the difference between the birth rates in non-family cap states. The use of this and
the previous alternative approaches of specifying the natural experiment provide additional
evidence for testing the hypothesis.

3. Data
We use data from the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation
Group (ORG) files. The ORG files contain annual samples that are roughly three times larger
than those from a monthly CPS, such as the commonly used March Annual Demographic Files.
The large sample sizes are important for identifying the potential effects of family caps. Also, the
CPS microdata provide detailed demographic information on the mother to include as controls in
the regressions and allow us to estimate models for the probability of birth because they include
observations for women not giving birth in the previous year.
We create our sample by first matching mothers to their children. The CPS assigns each
household an identification number (which is made unique within each year by affixing the
month and state variables to this number), and each individual within a household is assigned a
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unique identifier number. These variables are used in conjunction with spouse and parent
identifiers and the edited relationship to household head variable to match mothers to their
children. Because the CPS collects individual information by household, it is possible to match a
child to his/her mother only if that child is living in the same household as his/her mother. Thus,
we measure the number of children ages 18 and under who live in the household and not the
number of previous births.
After matching children to their mothers for the years 1989-1999, we confine our primary
sample to those women who are most likely to meet AFDC eligibility requirements. Therefore,
we restrict our sample to single, less educated (i.e. high school graduate or less) females who
have at least one previous child and who are between the ages of 15 and 45. In some of the
following analyses, however, we also include less-educated, married women with children as a
comparison group. The education-level restriction is imposed because the majority of welfare
participants whose educational status is known have no more than a high school education
(United States Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 1998).
To identify whether a woman has a birth in the survey year, we examine the age of her
matched children. If a woman has a child who is less than one year old, then we assume that that
woman gave birth in the preceding year.21 Because family cap policies aim to influence a
woman's decision to have an additional out-of-wedlock child, we take the year and month of each
observation and lag it 15 months. The purpose of the time lag is to take into account the ninemonth interval between the decision to have a child (or at least the decision to use contraceptives)
and the actual birth of the child. We also add 6 months to this lag because it represents the
midpoint over the previous year when the birth may have occurred.
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Note, for example, that twins or two children born separately in the same 12-month period are not double
counted.
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4. Results
TRENDS IN OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTH RATES
Figure 1 displays birth rates for single, less educated mothers (ages 15-45) in family cap
and non-family cap states for 1989 to 1998. Birth rates among our sample of women show a
downward trend over the ten-year time span from 1989 to 1998. This is true for both family cap
and non-family cap states. From 1989 to 1991, birth rates increased in both family cap and nonfamily cap states. In family cap states, the birth rate climbed from 6.2% in 1989 to 8.6% in 1991.
In non-family cap states, the birth rate increased from 6.5% in 1989 to a high of 7.4% in 1991.
After 1991, the average birth rate of our sample of females in family cap states fell by over 2
percentage points to 6.5% in 1992, and then bounced to its peak of 9% in 1993 before declining
sharply to a low of 4.8% in 1994.22 From 1994 to 1998, the birth rate in family cap states
continued to fluctuate, though less dramatically, and ended the period lower than it was prior to
1994. The average birth rate in non-family cap states followed a smoother downward path
declining from a high of 7.4% in 1991 to a low of 5.7% in 1994. After 1994, the birth rate in
non-family cap states increased moderately to 6.3% in 1997 and then falls to 6% in 1998.
Overall, birth rates in the family cap states followed a pattern similar to those in nonfamily cap states. The data also indicate that birth rates in family cap states were generally higher
than birth rates in non-family cap states from 1989 to 1993, whereas they were lower from 1994
to 1998, suggesting that family cap policies may have been effective in lowering birth rates
among single, less educated mothers.
Table 3 presents pre and post period out-of-wedlock birth rates for the family cap and
non-family cap states in our analysis. Comparing totals, we find that the birth rate for family cap
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A possible explanation for this sharp decrease may be the changes to CPS variables during this same time
period. Several variables experienced significant changes or were discontinued after 1993. However, we
took considerable care to account for any changes in variables and to ensure consistency in matching
mothers to children over the years.
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states (7.3%) during the pre period was slightly higher than the birth rate for non-family cap
states (6.9%). In the post period, the birth rate decreased in both the family cap and non-family
cap states. The decrease in the birth rate was greater in family cap states (1.7 percentage points)
than in non-family cap states (1.0 percentage point), suggesting that family cap policies may have
reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates.
Turning our attention to the Northeast, we find that New Jersey experienced a large
decrease in its mean birth rate− 2.5 percentage points−while non-family cap states in the
Northeast experienced a smaller decrease (1.1 percentage points) from the pre to post period.
Focusing on Southern states, however, we find a very different pattern. The birth rate in the
Southern family cap states remained essentially the same over the pre to the post period while it
decreased by 1.1 percentage points in the Southern non-family cap states. Overall, these results
provide evidence both supporting and contradicting the hypothesis that family cap policies
reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates. These results, however, are only suggestive. We now need
to control for changes in demographic characteristics.

ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY CAP POLICIES ON FERTILITY
To control for the potential effects of differential trends in demographic characteristics,
we estimate probit regressions for the probability of birth using our sample of single, lesseducated women with children. Table 4 reports coefficient estimates, standard errors and
marginal effects for Equation (2.1). 23 The dependent variable equals one if the woman had a
birth in the previous year and equals zero otherwise. In addition to state and year fixed effects, a
post-period dummy, unemployment rates, and maximum AFDC benefit levels, we include
controls for several individual characteristics affecting fertility. The coefficient estimates on
these explanatory variables have the expected signs. For example, we find that graduating from
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high school, living with parents, and having more previous children (up to 3 children) decrease
the probability of having a child. We also find that younger, non-white and never married women
have a higher probability of giving birth, all else equal.
We now turn to the results for the family cap policies. We first discuss estimates for
Specification 1, which includes the full sample of family cap and non-family cap states. The
coefficient on the family cap state and post period interaction variable is positive and small in
magnitude.24 The point estimate implies that family cap policies increase the probability of birth
by 0.41 percentage points. The coefficient, however, is not statistically significant. Although this
estimate does not provide evidence that family cap policies reduce out-of-wedlock birth rates
among single, less-educated mothers, we cannot rule out the possibility that negative effects exist.
A 95 percent confidence interval for our point estimate would be -0.1175 to 0.1896. Thus, we
cannot with reasonable confidence rule out negative effects that are smaller in absolute value than
-1.3 percentage points.
In Specification 1, the family cap effect is identified by grouping all family cap states;
however, there may exist some important differences across states. In Specification 2, we interact
each of the five family cap states with the post-period dummy variable. This allows for the
identification of separate family cap effects for the five states, which may be justified due to
differences in incremental AFDC benefit levels and additional AFDC waivers. Although none of
the coefficients are statistically significant, we find both positive and negative coefficients. The
post-period interactions for Indiana and Virginia are negative, whereas the interactions are
positive for Arkansas, Georgia and New Jersey.
The marginal effect or average derivative equals δΣϕ(Zit'π)/NT, where δ is the coefficient on the family
cap state/post-time period interaction variable, φ is the normal probability density function, Zit includes all
independent variables, and NT is the total sample size.
24
We also estimate this equation using a treatment group consisting of all states that implemented AFDC
family cap waivers prior to TANF. Thus, the treatment group includes New Jersey, Georgia, Arkansas,
Virginia, Indiana, Delaware, Mississippi, Arizona, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Illinois, Connecticut,
Wisconsin, Maryland, North Carolina, and California. The estimated effect of the family cap is small,
positive and statistically insignificant, similar to that in our original regression with only five family cap
states in the treatment group (the coefficient and standard error are 0.006 and 0.0583, respectively).
23

19

To check the robustness of the unexpected positive coefficients for Arkansas, Georgia,
and New Jersey, we conduct separate analyses for the South and Northeast. In Specification 3,
we only include family cap and non-family cap states in the South. By focusing on the South, we
are limiting our comparison group of states to those that are more similar to Arkansas, Georgia
and Virginia. We find a positive, although statistically insignificant, coefficient on the family cap
state and post-period interaction variable. This is consistent with a weighted average of the
positive coefficients found for Arkansas and Georgia and the negative coefficient found for
Virginia in the previous specification. In fact, the inclusion of only Southern non-family cap
states in the comparison group makes little difference to the coefficient estimates. In
Specification 4, we include separate post-period interactions for Arkansas, Georgia and Virginia.
We find very similar coefficient estimates on these post-period interactions as those reported in
Specification 2, which use all non-family cap states in the United States as the comparison group.
We also conduct a separate analysis for New Jersey. As noted above, New Jersey was
the first state to implement a family cap policy, and, thus, received a lot of attention. To create a
more appropriate comparison group, we select only non-family cap states in the Northeast.
Although the coefficient is now negative, it remains statistically insignificant.25 Therefore,
estimates using only Northeastern states as a comparison group for New Jersey do not provide
evidence suggesting that we change our conclusions regarding the effects of the family cap in this
state.
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 do not provide evidence that family cap policies
have a negative effect on out-of-wedlock birth rates (although confidence intervals for our point
estimates do not allow us to rule out negative effects). All of the estimated coefficients on the
family cap state and post-period interactions are statistically insignificant and many of them are
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We also estimate a probit regression including only Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania as
comparison states. The coefficient estimate on the New Jersey*Post Period interaction variable is -0.0964
and the standard error is 0.1057.
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positive. It is important to note that our results do not vary much from those of the formal
experimental evaluations of New Jersey’s and Arkansas’ family cap waivers. These evaluations
do not provide strong evidence of a negative effect on fertility. Interestingly, our analysis, which
uses multiple comparison groups and data from a source less susceptible to contamination bias,
also does not provide evidence that family caps were effective in reducing out-of-wedlock births.
As noted above, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia implemented additional
waivers at the same time as their family cap policies. Therefore, our estimated effects of family
cap policies for these states may include the effects of other waivers. We argue, however, that the
concurrent implementation of these waivers should not change our conclusions regarding the
effects of the family cap policy. First, the family cap was the only AFDC waiver that specifically
targeted childbearing incentives. The family cap explicitly denied additional benefits to women
having children while receiving AFDC, whereas the other waivers implemented by these states -time limits (Indiana and Virginia), JOBS sanctions (Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia),
changes to JOBS work exemptions (Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia), work requirement time
limit (Virginia), and increased earnings disregards (Virginia) -- generally created incentives to
work and/or leave the AFDC rolls. Furthermore, the AFDC-UP waiver in Indiana may have
reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates indirectly by increasing the probability of marriage. We
discuss the broader issue of how marriage may affect our results below. Although these policies
may have indirectly affected the fertility decisions of AFDC recipients, their effects should have
been small relative to the effects of family cap policies.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, if the waivers had an effect, their effects
generally should be negative, which is the same as the hypothesized effect of the family cap.26
Our estimates do not provide evidence that the implementation of family cap policies and the
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As noted above, the increased earnings disregard may have increased non-marital fertility by expanding
eligibility for welfare. The hypothesized positive effect of this policy, especially when combined with the
family cap, is unlikely, however, as the opportunity cost of having an additional child on welfare is large.
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other aforementioned waivers had a negative effect on the incidence of out-of-wedlock births.
Therefore, we conclude that our estimates do not provide evidence that family caps affected
fertility. We also should note that the one family cap state that did not implement additional
waivers -- Arkansas -- had a positive (although statistically insignificant) coefficient on the post
period-family cap interaction variable.
We estimated two additional regressions to further explore these issues. First, we
estimated a regression which included all possible control states. This modified control group
includes states that also implemented non-family cap welfare waivers in addition to our previous
control states. The coefficient on the family cap post variable remains very small and statistically
insignificant (the coefficient and standard error are -0.0081 and 0.0749, respectively).
We also estimated a specification that includes all states and incorporates waiver
controls. The experimental group now includes all states implementing a family cap and the
control group includes all other states. We include dummy variables for each of the major AFDC
waivers (i.e. family caps, termination/reduction time limits, changes to JOBS work exemptions,
changes to JOBS sanctions, increases in earnings disregards, and work requirement time limits,
Crouse 1999). We continue to exclude post-TANF observations for all states. The results
generally support our assertions regarding the other AFDC waivers. The estimated coefficients
on the AFDC waiver dummy variables are small and not statistically significant. The only
exception is that we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the work
requirement time limits dummy variable. We should note, however, that work requirement time
limits were usually implemented at the same time as the other work-related waivers and our
estimates are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of a couple of outlier states. It is important to
also note that in our main specifications reported above the only experimental state that
implemented a work requirement time limit is Virginia and none of the control states
implemented any waivers. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on the family cap waiver
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dummy remains small and statistically insignificant (the coefficient and standard error are 0.0117 and 0.0639, respectively). Therefore, the inclusion of wavier controls and additional
states does not change our main conclusion regarding the effects of family caps.

DIFFERENTIAL TIME TRENDS
A problem arises with the preceding interpretation of the "difference–in-differences"
estimates if family cap and non-family cap states had differential underlying trends in out-ofwedlock birth rates during the 1990s. These trends may have "washed out" the observed effects
of family cap policies. To address these concerns, we estimate probit regressions that include
separate time trends for family cap and non-family cap states. Table 5 reports estimates for
Equation (2.2), which includes a linear time trend interacted with family cap states. The main
time trend is captured in the year fixed effects. The coefficient estimates on the family cap-time
trend interactions in all three specifications are small and statistically insignificant, and thus do
not provide evidence that family cap states experienced a different trend in out-of-wedlock birth
rates.
In Table 5, Specification 1 includes the full sample of family cap and non-family cap
states. The estimated coefficient on the family cap state and post period interaction variable is
small, negative and statistically insignificant. Specification 2 focuses on family cap and nonfamily cap states in the South. As before, the coefficient on the family cap state and post period
interaction is positive and insignificant. The results for Specification 3, which includes only New
Jersey and non-family cap states in the Northeast, are interesting in terms of the magnitude of the
estimated effect of New Jersey’s family cap policy. The coefficient on the New Jersey and postperiod interaction variable is negative and large in magnitude. Although statistically
insignificant, the point estimate implies that New Jersey’s family cap policy decreased the
probability of out-of-wedlock births among single, less educated mothers by 3.25 percentage
points.
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Again, the lack of statistical significance weakens any inferences from these results.
Nevertheless, the estimates do not provide any evidence suggesting that family caps reduced
fertility.
The findings from Table 5 also provide some suggestive evidence on the question of
whether the family cap policies implemented in our sample of states were in response to upward
trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates, and thus represent an endogenous policy intervention. As
noted above, however, we do not find evidence indicating that family cap and non-family cap
states experienced a differential time trend in fertility. To investigate this further, we ran a
second set of regressions with time trend interactions excluding observations from the post family
cap period for both family cap states and control states. If family caps were implemented in
response to trends in fertility then we should find an upward trend in out-of-wedlock birth rates in
family cap states relative to the trend in non-family cap states. We find a small, positive, but
statistically insignificant coefficient on the family cap state and time trend interactions in the
U.S., South, and Northeast specifications. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that family
caps were implemented as a reaction to fertility trends among welfare recipients, our estimates do
not provide evidence suggesting that this is the case.

ESTIMATES USING MARRIED WOMEN AS A CONTROL GROUP
In order to further examine the effectiveness of the family cap, we estimate probit
regressions for the probability of birth using married, less educated women with children as the
comparison group (Equation (2.3)). We restrict our sample to only family cap states in order to
compare trends in birth rates between less educated single and married women with children. In
theory, married women should not be affected (or at least only minimally affected) by family cap
policies because they typically are not eligible to receive AFDC benefits; however, they may be
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affected similarly by other factors affecting fertility among low-income women.27 Thus, the
coefficient of interest in Equation (2.3) corresponds to the single woman and post period
interaction variable.
Table 6 reports estimates for Equation (2.3). As expected, single women have lower birth
rates relative to married women, all else equal. The results for family cap policies are as follows.
In Specification 1, we include all five family cap states in our sample. We find a negative and
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of single woman and post period. The point
estimate implies that family caps decrease the probability of birth by 1.6 percentage points.
Restricting our sample to family cap states in the South (Specification 2), we find a positive,
although insignificant, coefficient on the single woman and post period interaction. In
Specification 3 we focus on New Jersey. The estimated coefficient on the interaction of single
woman and post period is negative and large in magnitude. The coefficient, however, is
statistically insignificant.
The use of less-educated married women with children as a comparison group provides
some evidence that family caps decrease fertility among single mothers. The evidence, however,
only comes from one of the reported specifications.

DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES
Expanding on the difference-in-differences strategy for estimating the effectiveness of
family cap policies, we combine Equations (2.1) and (2.3) to compare changes over time in the
difference between the birth rates of single and married women in family cap states to changes
over time in the difference between the corresponding birth rates in non-family cap states.
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To further investigate this assumption we estimated two regressions. First, we estimated a probit
regression in which we included a linear time trend interacted with a dummy variable for single mothers
using the entire period for control states and the pre-period for family cap states. We do not find evidence
of different trends in fertility between single and married women with children. We also estimated a
regression in which we only included family cap states and similarly found no evidence of differential
trends in fertility between single and married mothers before the implementation of family caps.
25

Family cap policies should primarily affect the fertility decisions of single women with children
who live in family cap states during the post-family cap period. As identified in Equation (2.4),
we employ a "difference-in-difference-in-differences" estimator to test this hypothesis.
Table 7 reports estimates for Equation (2.4). The results for the family cap policies are
embodied in the estimated coefficients for the triple interaction variable of single woman, family
cap state, and post period. Specification 1 includes the full sample of married and single women
in family cap and non-family cap states. The coefficient on the triple interaction variable is
negative; however, it also is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. In Specification 2,
we include only single and married mothers who live in family cap and non-family cap states in
the South. The estimated coefficient on the triple interaction variable is large and positive,
although statistically insignificant. Estimating Equation (2.4) including only observations from
New Jersey and other Northeastern states (Specification 3), we find a negative, but statistically
insignificant coefficient on the triple interaction variable.
The results of the "difference-in-difference-in-differences” estimator do not differ
qualitatively from the results reported in Table 4. In all specifications, we find statistically
insignificant coefficients, and thus do not find evidence that family caps reduced fertility. These
results also are consistent with those of Joyce, et al. (2003) who use state-level data aggregated
from induced termination of pregnancy files, national nativity files, and the Current Population
Survey and do not find consistent evidence suggesting that family caps affect birth and abortion
rates. Interestingly, their sample does not include New Jersey and Georgia and uses a different
identification strategy for their difference-in-difference-in-differences estimator. They compare
changes in birth rates for less-educated single mothers to changes in birth rates for less-educated
single women without children.
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FAMILY CAPS AND MARRIAGE
One concern with these results and those reported above is that family caps, or possibly
the waivers implemented with them, may affect the opportunity costs of marriage. This may have
an indirect effect on estimates of the impacts of family caps on out-of-wedlock birth rates by
changing the sample composition of single woman with children. In particular, a single mother
may be more likely to marry the father of her child with the implementation of family caps
because the penalty of marriage is now lower.
We investigate this issue further by estimating two regressions. First, we estimate a
regression that includes both less-educated, single and married women with children in the
sample, but excludes the interactions between single women, and family cap states, the post
period and family cap state*post period. Thus, the family cap effect is identified by a comparison
of the change in birth rates among single and married mothers in family cap states and the change
in the birth rates among single and married mothers in non-family cap states. If family caps
influence the likelihood of marriage it will have no effect on the estimates because single and
married mothers are grouped together. The coefficient estimate on the modified family cap
state/post period interaction is positive (0.0521) and statistically insignificant.
We also directly investigated the hypothesis of whether family caps affect marriage.
Specifically, we estimated a regression in which the dependent variable is the probability of
marriage using our sample of less-educated, single and married women with children. We
included an interaction between family cap states and the post period. We find a very small and
statistically insignificant coefficient on this interaction. Therefore, the estimates do not provide
evidence that family caps affected the probability of marriage among less-educated women with
children.
Perhaps these results are not entirely surprising. Although family caps may lower the
opportunity costs of getting married to the father of the child, they are small relative to the total
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AFDC benefit. Thus, the main opportunity cost of marriage will be the potential loss of the chief
component of the AFDC benefit that the woman currently is receiving.

5. Conclusions
We use microdata from the 1989 to 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing
Rotation Group (ORG) files to examine trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates among single, lesseducated women with children prior to the implementation of state TANF programs. In
particular, we compare trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates in the first five states to implement
family cap policies -- Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia -- to trends in several
sets of comparison states that did not implement family caps or other waivers during our sample
period. In simple comparisons of trends in birth rates, we find that Indiana, New Jersey, and
Virginia experienced larger declines in out-of-wedlock birth rates after the implementation of
family cap policies than the relevant comparison group of non-family cap states. We also find,
however, that Arkansas and Georgia experienced large increases in out-of-wedlock birth rates
over the same period in which a group of comparison states from the South experienced a large
decline in out-of-wedlock birth rates.
In our first set of probit regressions for the probability of a birth among single, lesseducated women with children, we do not find evidence that family cap polices have a negative
effect on fertility. All of the estimated coefficients for the variable embodying the effect of the
family cap policy are statistically insignificant and many of them are positive. Furthermore, even
after controlling for differential time trends in out-of-wedlock birth rates between family cap and
non-family cap states, we continue to find a lack of statistical significance as well as a positive
coefficient for the Southern family cap states. We should note, however, that confidence
intervals for the point estimates cannot rule out negative effects.
In the next set of probit regressions, we compare trends in birth rates between single and
married mothers in family cap states. Thus, we use less-educated, married women with children
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in family cap states instead of less-educated, single mothers in non-family cap states as the
comparison group. Although we use a different source of variation to identify the effects of
family cap policies, we find somewhat similar results. The important exception is that we find a
negative and statistically significant coefficient in the full specification providing some evidence
that family caps reduced out-of-wedlock birth rates.
In our final set of probit regressions, we compare changes over time in the difference
between the birth rates of single and married women in family cap states to changes over time in
the difference between the birth rates of single and married women in non-family cap states.
Using this "difference-in-difference-in-differences" estimator, we do not find evidence that
family cap polices reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births among single, less-educated
women with children.
With the exception of Arkansas, our "family cap" states implemented additional waivers
that may have affected fertility. We argue, however, that the implementation of these other
waiver policies in Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey and Virginia does not change our conclusions
regarding the effectiveness of family cap policies in reducing out-of-wedlock births in these
states. This is because we do not expect the additional waivers to have a large negative effect on
fertility, and, similar to the family cap, these other AFDC waivers aimed to encourage selfsufficiency among welfare recipients (DHHS, 1997). We also do not find evidence of a family
cap effect when experimenting with controls for other waivers and using larger samples of
experimental and control states. Thus, our general lack of evidence of a negative effect of the
family cap and other waivers on fertility implies that our findings do not support the hypothesis
that family cap policies reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births.
In general, our estimates do not provide evidence that family cap policies reduce out-ofwedlock birth rates among single, less-educated women with children. The effects of family cap
policies on fertility may be limited because incremental benefit levels are substantially lower than
the estimated costs of raising a child, many welfare spells are short, the importance of non-
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pecuniary factors, the unanticipated nature of some pregnancies, and the partial offsetting of lost
benefits from Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits.28 If policymakers aim to reduce fertility among
welfare recipients, relying on family caps as the policy tool may not produce the desired results.
It remains to be seen, however, if the changes implemented under TANF will have larger effects
on out-of-wedlock birth rates.
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See Haveman and Wolfe (1995), Anderson (1989), Bane and Ellwood (1994), Zelnik and Kantner
(1980), and Maynard, et al (1998) for evidence.
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Figure 1
Birth Rates for Single, Less Educated Mothers (Ages 15-45) - CPS
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Table 1
States with Family Cap Policies as of 1998
In Order of Implementation Date

State
New Jersey
Georgia
Arkansas
Indiana
Virginia
Delaware
Mississippi
Arizona
Massachusetts
Nebraska
Illinois
Connecticut
Wisconsin*
Maryland
North Carolina
Tennessee
Florida
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Wyoming
Idaho*
California
North Dakota

Family Cap
Implementation Date
Oct-92
Jan-94
Jul-94
May-95
Jul-95
Oct-95
Oct-95
Nov-95
Nov-95
Nov-95
Dec-95
Jan-96
Jan-96
Mar-96
Jul-96
Sep-96
Oct-96
Oct-96
Oct-96
Feb-97
Jul-97
Aug-97
Jul-98

AFDC
Waiver
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

TANF
Rule

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Sources:
(1) The Urban Institute (May 1998). "One Year After Federal Welfare Reform: A Description
of State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Decisions as of October 1997."
(2) State of Wyoming Department of Family Services
*Idaho and Wisconsin have flat benefit structures under their TANF plans, resulting in an implicit family
cap.

Table 2
Selected State Characteristics (1992 and 1996)

State
Family Cap States
Arkansas
Georgia
Indiana
New Jersey
Virginia
Non-Cap States
Northeast
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
New York*
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Alabama
District of Columbia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
West Virginia
Other Non-Cap States
Alaska
Hawaii
Idaho
Kansas
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Washington

AFDC Benefit Levels
1992
1996
% Change

Abortion Providers
1992
1996
% Change

Unemployment Rate
1992
1996
% Change

204
280
288
424
354

182
249
256
377
315

-11%
-11%
-11%
-11%
-11%

8
55
19
88
64

6
41
16
94
57

-25%
-25%
-16%
7%
-11%

7.2
6.9
6.5
8.4
6.4

5.4
4.6
4.1
6.2
4.4

-25%
-33%
-37%
-26%
-31%

680
453
539
516
640
421
554

566
372
503
490
570
375
493

-17%
-18%
-7%
-5%
-11%
-11%
-11%

43
17
64
16
289
81
6

40
16
51
16
266
61
5

-7%
-6%
-20%
0%
-8%
-25%
-17%

7.5
7.1
8.5
7.5
8.5
7.5
8.9

5.7
5.1
4.3
4.2
6.2
5.3
5.1

-24%
-28%
-49%
-44%
-27%
-29%
-43%

$149
409
228
190
377
272
341
210
185
184
249

$146
374
233
169
332
242
273
178
165
167
225

-2%
-9%
2%
-11%
-12%
-11%
-20%
-15%
-11%
-9%
-10%

20
15
9
17
51
86
11
18
33
79
5

14
18
8
15
47
59
11
14
20
64
4

-30%
20%
-11%
-12%
-8%
-31%
0%
-22%
-39%
-19%
-20%

7.3
8.4
6.9
8.1
6.6
5.9
5.7
6.2
6.4
7.5
11.3

5.1
8.5
5.6
6.7
4.9
4.3
4.1
6.0
5.2
5.6
7.5

-30%
1%
-19%
-17%
-26%
-27%
-28%
-3%
-19%
-25%
-34%

924
666
315
422
390
372
324
401
334
531

821
634
282
382
378
310
346
384
303
486

-11%
-5%
-10%
-10%
-3%
-17%
7%
-4%
-9%
-8%

13
52
9
15
12
17
20
1
45
65

8
44
7
10
11
14
13
1
37
57

-38%
-15%
-22%
-33%
-8%
-18%
-35%
0%
-18%
-12%

9.1
4.5
6.5
4.2
6.7
6.6
6.8
4.9
7.2
7.5

7.8
6.4
5.2
4.5
5.3
5.4
8.1
3.1
4.9
6.5

-14%
42%
-20%
7%
-21%
-18%
19%
-37%
-32%
-13%

Sources:
(1) Henshaw, Stanley K. (1998), "Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States, 1995-1996," Family Planning Perspectives 30, pp. 263-270 & 287.
(2) 1998 "Greenbook," U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means
(3) 1998 and 1994 "Statistical Abstract of the United States," U.S. Census Bureau
*Average of benefits in New York City and Suffolk County

Table 3
Comparison of Birth Rates in Family Cap and Non-Family Cap States
Pre Period
Birth Rate
Family Cap States
Arkansas
Georgia
Virginia
South Total
Indiana
New Jersey
Total
Non-Cap States
South
Northeast
Total

Post Period

Sample
Size

Birth Rate

Sample
Size

Post-Pre
(Difference)

6.8%
6.6%
6.0%
6.4%
9.2%
7.5%
7.3%

659
897
831
2,387
790
1,405
4,582

7.9%
7.6%
3.1%
6.7%
2.2%
5.0%
5.5%

324
234
154
712
94
1,086
1,892

1.1%
1.0%
-3.0%
0.3%
-7.1%
-2.5%
-1.7%

6.9%
6.9%
6.9%

12,180
6,628
27,674

5.8%
5.8%
5.8%

2,143
5,749
7,455

-1.1%
-1.1%
-1.0%

Notes: (1) The sample consists of single, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) All estimates use sample weights provided by the CPS.

Table 4
Probit Regressions for Probability of Out-of-Wedlock Birth
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

U.S.

U.S.

South

South

Northeast

Age

0.0165
(0.0132)
[0.0019]

0.0167
(0.0152)
[0.0019]

-0.0257
(0.0229)
[-0.0030]

-0.0250
(0.0229)
[-0.0029]

0.0376
(0.0250)
[0.0042]

Age Squared

-0.0013
(0.0002)
[-0.0001]

-0.0014
(0.0003)
[-0.0002]

-0.0007
(0.0004)
[-0.0001]

-0.0007
(0.0004)
[-0.0001]

-0.0016
(0.0004)
[-0.0002]

Black

0.2185
(0.0253)
[0.0250]

0.2194
(0.0275)
[0.0251]

0.2419
(0.0417)
[0.0279]

0.2433
(0.0418)
[0.0280]

0.1956
(0.0455)
[0.0218]

Hispanic

0.1558
(0.0445)
[0.0178]

0.1563
(0.0367)
[0.0179]

0.2708
(0.0704)
[0.0312]

0.2696
(0.0703)
[0.0310]

0.1238
(0.0510)
[0.0138]

Asian

0.2333
(0.0960)
[0.0267]

0.232
(0.1046)
[0.0266]

0.2509
(0.2370)
[0.0289]

0.2435
(0.2379)
[0.0280]

0.2897
(0.1583)
[0.0323]

Native American

0.3315
(0.0826)
[0.0380]

0.332
(0.0641)
[0.0380]

0.2452
(0.1499)
[0.0282]

0.2445
(0.1500)
[0.0281]

-0.1472
(0.2875)
[-0.0164]

Never Married

0.0501
(0.0208)
[0.0057]

0.0502
(0.0253)
[0.0057]

0.0285
(0.0396)
[0.0033]

0.0285
(0.0396)
[0.0033]

0.0601
(0.0423)
[0.0067]

High School Graduate

-0.1852
(0.0243)
[-0.0212]

-0.1851
(0.0217)
[-0.0212]

-0.1418
(0.0330)
[-0.0163]

-0.1424
(0.0330)
[-0.0164]

-0.2152
(0.0370)
[-0.0240]

Number of Previous
Children

-0.1661
(0.0300)
[-0.0190]

-0.1666
(0.0281)
[-0.0191]

-0.1081
0.0414
[-0.0124]

-0.1095
(0.0415)
[-0.0126]

-0.1958
(0.0502)
[-0.0219]

Number of Previous
Children Squared

0.0258
(0.0046)
[0.0030]

0.0258
(0.0045)
[0.0030]

0.0177
0.0065
[0.0020]

0.0178
(0.0065)
[0.0020]

0.0273
(0.0084)
[0.0030]

Live with Parents

-0.2161
(0.0259)
[-0.0247]

-0.2154
(0.0294)
[-0.0247]
(continued)

-0.1758
(0.0425)
[-0.0202]

-0.1759
(0.0425)
[-0.0202]

-0.2324
(0.0514)
[-0.0259]

Sample

Table 4
(continued)
(1)
Family Cap State*Post
Period

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0360
(0.0784)
[0.0041]

Arkansas*Post Period

0.1838
(0.1392)
[0.0210]

0.2237
(0.1524)
[0.0257]

Georgia*Post Period

0.2489
(0.1532)
[0.0285]

0.2767
(0.1605)
[0.0318]

Indiana*Post Period

-0.4929
(0.3356)
[-0.0564]

New Jersey*Post Period

0.0163
(0.1021)
[0.0019]

Virginia*Post Period

-0.2895
(0.2256)
[-0.0331]

Southern Family Cap
State *Post Period
Sample Birth Rate
Sample Size
Log Likelihood

(5)

-0.0608
(0.0991)
[-0.0068]
-0.2666
(0.2318)
[-0.0307]
0.1439
(0.1071)
[0.0166]

0.0654
41,612
-8,922.62

0.0654
41,612
-8,918.10

0.0662
17,427
-3,754.99

0.0662
17,427
-3,752.53

0.0627
14,869
-3,116.79

Notes: (1) The sample consists of single, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has a birth in the previous year.
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, and probability
derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets below the standard errors. (4) Each equation
includes state and year fixed effects, post-period dummy, unemployment rates, and
maximum AFDC benefit levels.

Table 5
Probit Regressions for Probability of Out-of-Wedlock Birth including Time Trends
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)
(1)
U.S.

(2)
South

(3)
Northeast

Family Cap State*Time Trend

0.0166
(0.0259)
[0.0019]

0.0314
(0.0261)
[0.0036]

0.0616
(0.0408)
[0.0069]

Family Cap State*Post Period

-0.0334
(0.1558)
[-0.0038]

0.0185
(0.1484)
[0.0021]

-0.2914
(0.1843)
[-0.0325]

Sample Birth Rate
Sample Size
Log Likelihood

0.0655
41,612
-8,922.27

0.0662
17,427
-3,754.27

0.0627
14,869
-3,115.65

Sample

Notes: (1) The sample consists of single, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has a birth in the previous year.
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, and probability
derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets below the standard errors. (4) Each equation
includes all controls used in Table 4.

Table 6
Probit Regressions for Probability of Birth including Married Women
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)
(1)

(2)

(3)

AR, GA, IN,
NJ, VA

AR, GA, VA

NJ

Single Woman

-0.2084
(0.0500)
[-0.0227]

-0.1915
(0.0713)
[-0.0200]

-0.2632
(0.0907)
[-0.0296]

Single Woman*Post Period

-0.1443
(0.0733)
[-0.0157]

0.0316
(0.1127)
[0.0033]

-0.1738
(0.1069)
[-0.0195]

Sample Birth Rate
Sample Size
Log Likelihood

0.0625
20,429
-4,164.04

0.0597
9,836
-1,927.15

0.0650
7,491
-1,575.77

Sample

Notes: (1) The sample consists of single and married, less educated women with
children (ages 15-45). (2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has
a birth in the previous year. (3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates, and probability derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets
below the standard errors. (4) Each equation includes all controls used in Table 4.

Table 7
Probit Regressions for Probability of Birth including Married Women
Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1989-1999)
(1)

(2)

(3)

U.S.

South

Northeast

Single Woman

-0.2396
(0.0243)
[-0.0267]

-0.1637
(0.0311)
[-0.0177]

-0.2996
(0.0347)
[-0.0338]

Single Woman*Post Period

-0.0609
(0.0393)
[-0.0068]

-0.1306
(0.0582)
[-0.0141]

-0.0334
(0.0583)
[-0.0038]

Single Woman*Family Cap State

0.0368
(0.0423)
[0.0041]

-0.0057
(0.0582)
[-0.0006]

0.0228
(0.0716)
[0.0026]

Family Cap State*Post Period

0.0874
(0.0499)
[0.0097]

-0.0234
(0.0782)
[-0.0025]

0.1495
(0.0764)
[0.0169]

Single*Family Cap State*Post Period

-0.0771
(0.0786)
[-0.0086]

0.1590
(0.1269)
[0.0172]

-0.1413
(0.1220)
[-0.0160]

0.0648
131,796
-27,484.82

0.0626
52,672
-10,641.75

0.0651
44,820
-9,467.74

Sample

Sample Birth Rate
Sample Size
Log Likelihood

Notes: (1) The sample consists of single and married, less educated women with children (ages 15-45).
(2) The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the woman has a birth in the previous year.
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, and probability
derivatives (marginal effects) are in brackets below the standard errors. (4) Each equation
includes state and year fixed effects.

